Anti-Human Bid monoclonal antibody

Objective: Postherpetic neuralgia (PHN) is a condition that results from nerve dysfunction following an episode of acute herpes zoster (shingles). Mirogabalin is a novel, selective oral alpha(2)delta ligand that demonstrated safety and efficacy in a multicenter, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled 14-week study in Asian patients with PHN. This 52-week, open-label extension study investigated the long-term safety and efficacy of flexible-dosage mirogabalin in Asian patients with PHN. Methods: This open-label extension study enrolled patients who completed the placebo-controlled study. Patients started with a dose of 5 mg mirogabalin twice daily (BID), which was followed by a flexible dose of 10 or 15 mg BID. During the study, patients assessed their pain using the Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ). Adverse events were monitored throughout the study. Results: Of 239 enrolled patients, 184 (77.0%) completed the study and 185 patients (77.4%) received the 15 mg BID dose most during the treatment duration.Most treatment-emergent adverse events (TEAEs) were mild or moderate. The most common TEAEs were nasopharyngitis, somnolence, dizziness, weight increased, and edema. All SF-MPQ scales decreased from baseline to week 52. Conclusions: This study showed the safety and stable pain management of a long-term flexible dosing regimen of mirogabalin 10 or 15 mg twice daily for 52 weeks in patients with PHN. Summary for Table of Contents: Mirogabalin-a novel alpha(2)delta oral ligand-was shown to be effective and well tolerated for treating postherpetic neuralgia (PHN) in an Asian multicenter, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, 14-week study. This open-label, 52-week study was conducted as an extension of the double-blind study to demonstrate long-term safety and efficacy of mirogabalin.

In a government auction program where first-price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than English auctions, I document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants. Motivated by additional data evidence, I estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals' participation is stochastic, allowing for bidders' risk aversion and asymmetry. Counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders' uncertainty about the number of entrants, combined with risk aversion, substantially softens the revenue impact of low competition in first-price auctions. This explains the observed revenue patterns and uncovers an empirically important reason for sellers to favor first-price auctions over English auctions.